Kathy J. Baum v. Michael Hayes : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Kathy J. Baum v. Michael Hayes : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall Lee Marshall; attorney for appellant.
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Stephen C. Clark; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; attorneys for
appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Kathy J. Baum v. Michael Hayes, No. 20091028 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2066
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHY J. BAUM, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
MICHAEL HAYES, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20091028-CA 
Trial Court No. 044905929 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLEE KATIIY J. BAUM 
APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE TYRONE MEDLEY PRESIDING 
Randall Lee Marshall 
2560 Washington Blvd., Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Kenneth A. Oka/aki (USB // 3844) 
Stephen C. Clark (USB // 4551) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE CO? JR r ^ 
JUL 1 9 201U 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHY J. BAUM, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
MICHAEL HAYES, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20091028-CA 
Trial Court No. 044905929 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLEE KATHY J. BAUM 
APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE TYRONE MEDLEY PRESIDING 
Randall Lee Marshall 
2560 Washington Blvd., Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Kenneth A. Okazaki (USB # 3844) 
Stephen C. Clark (USB #4551) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant A ttorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
938564 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
A. General Background 4 
B. Facts Relating to Ms. Baum's Financial Contributions in the Marital Estate 6 
C. Facts Relating to Ms. Baum's Need for Alimony 9 
D. Facts Relating to Dr. Hayes' Ability to Pay Alimony 10 
E. Ms. Baum's Appeal, and This Court's Remand 12 
F. Trial Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree.... 12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 15 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON REMAND DOES NOT 
MANIFEST AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 15 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVISED ITS ALIMONY 
RULING AS TO DR. HAYES' ABILTITY TO PAY BASED ON 
HIS HISTORICAL EARNINGS AND UNDISPUTED 
CONTINUING ASSOCIATION WITH WALDEN UNIVERSITY 25 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVISED ITS CHILD 
SUPPORT RULING BASED ON DR. HAYES' HISTORICAL 
EARNINGS 29 
CONCLUSION 30 
938564.1 
r A M, K () t AUTHORITIES 
Page 
M A I i * \M\> 
•Hired v. AllretL <9", P.„d i iu>x> vv.iaii L.I. /vpp. . '•'• 
flatty v. flatty, 2 0 0 6 U T APP- 5 ( )6- 1 5 3 P - 3 d 8 2 7 
5 A M v. //ayes, 2008 IJT App 3 ! 2. 23. 24 
Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah t t. App. 1995). ?s 
Childs v. CMos, 967 P.2d 942 (I Ital) ( l \; •-> 199X. i -^  
Cox v. Cox, 877 P.?d 1262 (Utah Ct. App. i 994)... • > 
Crompton v. Crompion, 888 P.2d 686 (I hah Ct. App. IW4, ?S 
Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct App | ,KH> 
. i . i >,. /////, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994 '8 
Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah ( t. App. I 99S 
flbage v. Hodge, 20(F 1 1 \ p P 394 
Howellv. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah ( I. Vpp. 1991) •» .»•• 29 
/J/C //ea/f/i Servs., /«c. v. D&K Management hie . 200* I ' ' ' "* 22 
In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, 137P.3d809 21 22.23.25 
Jensen v. flowed, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. \pp 1995)... , 29 
Jones v. ./owes, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) - 26 
Moon v. Moon. I1'1'" I : I \p ;- ! 2. 9"" P.2d 4 IS 
/>q#e/ v. Pa//e/. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 15 
Reinhart v Reinhart. 963 P ?d 757 (Utah Ct. App ; 99:- 29 
Richardson v. Richardson, 2007UT App 222 20 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App > 99 I) . ^  
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876>.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App 1994) 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1 lW> > 24 
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. I998j 28 
State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989) ^ 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App }•<-'<<»- •< •• I 
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219 .24 
Woodwardv. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985) ; 
Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, 201 P.3d 301, cert, denied. 21 I P.3d 986 (Utah 2009) 
S T A i i IKS 
UtaU .-de Am; 9 /&-4>/.:>(.:; ?9 
Uiai.eudcAMM §78A-4-103... 
Utah Code Ann $ 78B-12-203(:vj •> -) 
M Vlh K( l.l- -
1 t.i!- Rules ol Appeii.nc ii.-. , J ih i . kwk ... Ha;(V) 1,2 
1 • •; !-'..!.»v;c»rAnn«*ll:it.- f>; lure, Rules 3 and 4 1 
938564.1 
M 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103 and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Has Appellant, who does not adequately challenge the trial court's findings 
in support of its alimony and child support determinations, shown that the findings are 
unsupported by substantial evidence? In challenging the trial court's findings, an 
appellant "must first 'marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.'" Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ^ 9, 176 P.3d 476 (citation omitted); see also Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant who wishes to challenge a factual finding to 
marshal the evidence supporting that finding before attacking it); Moon v. Moon, 1999 
UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431 ("When an appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of 
marshaling the evidence . . . we assume that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court.") (quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Has Appellant shown that the trial court's findings reflect a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion? "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony and child support, and such determinations will be upheld on appeal unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."1 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Appellee respectfully sets forth her own statement of the 
issues properly before this Court. As an initial matter, Appellee notes that Appellant 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal to this Court for the second time. The first appeal, brought 
by Petitioner/Appellee Kathy Baum ("Ms. Baum"), resulted in a remand to the trial court 
for additional findings related to its determinations of alimony and child support. On 
remand, the trial court applied the proper analytical framework, made the necessary 
findings, and determined alimony and child support accordingly. 
has failed to meet the requirement of Rule 24(a)(5)(A) that his brief include "citation 
to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." This is 
important because Appellant's framing of the issues on appeal not only seeks to raise 
issues for the first time on appeal, but also is directly contrary to his arguments below. 
Specifically, as to his first stated issue, Appellant not only did not preserve the issue, 
he never even argued to the trial court that it was required by "law of the case" to 
make "specific findings of clear error or a compelling reason" for revising the award 
of alimony and child support in the Amended Decree. {See R. 704-05; R. 806 p. 22 1. 
4 - p . 31 1.7). 
Appellant also took an entirely different position below than he takes now on his 
second stated issue, the nature of this Court's mandate. Appellant's position below 
was that the trial court's only option was to restate the findings and conclusions it had 
already reached. {Id.). That position was flatly contrary to this Court's statement that 
it was remanding the case to the trial court "for more detailed findings without 
restriction to any corrections or modifications the trial court deems appropriate." See 
Baum v. Hayes, 2008 UT App 371,^16. It was also contrary to other precedent 
emphasizing the same point. See, e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 394, J^ 7 ("We 
do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the 
conclusion already reached.") (citing Alfred v. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990)). Now that the trial court has properly concluded that corrections and 
modifications were indeed appropriate, Appellant tries a new tack on appeal. 
Appellant's attempt to raise new issues for the first time on appeal, and to impose 
anything other than a straightforward "abuse of discretion" standard based on "law of 
the case," cannot detract from the reality that this appeal is limited to examining 
whether the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact support its revisions to the 
alimony and child support awards and reflect an appropriate use of the trial court's 
substantial discretion. 
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Having argued below that the trial court's only option on remand was to reiterate 
its original alimony and child support awards, Respondent/Appellant Michael Hayes 
("Dr. Hayes") now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing those 
awards. In so doing, however, he fails to meet his own burden to marshal the facts in 
support of the trial court's findings on remand, and likewise fails to meet the heavy 
burden required to show an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dr. Hayes' "Statement of Relevant Facts" selectively lays out the evidence and 
argument favorable to Dr. Hayes' position, but ignores the actual findings made by the 
trial court on remand. This approach does not constitute a proper challenge to the trial 
court's findings on remand. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting husband's statement of facts that merely reargued evidence 
supporting his position). 
To properly challenge a trial court's findings, an appellant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 
431 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and citation omitted). "If the appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the case." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
938564.1 
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Because Dr. Hayes has not marshaled the evidence or otherwise properly 
challenged any of the trial court's specific findings on remand, the relevant facts are the 
trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, attached as Addendum F to Appellant's 
Brief. Although Dr. Hayes failed to satisfy the marshalling requirement as set forth 
below, the evidence amply supports the trial court's findings, thus precluding Dr. Hayes 
from meeting his burden to leave this Court with "a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made" by the trial court on remand. See Cummings v. Cummings, 821 
P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted). 
A. General Background 
The parties were married on September 11, 1987 in Utah. (R. 591, at 97:3-7). 
The only child of the marriage, Ruby, was born April 18, 1992. (Id. at 97:13-16). 
When the parties married, Ms. Baum was working at the Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute as an office assistant doing payroll and benefits. (Id. at 104:14-22). Dr. Hayes 
was a full-time student and worked part time at Realms of Inquiry, a private school. (Id, 
at 104:23 - 105:12). Ms. Baum was soon recruited by a start-up company called NPS 
Pharmaceuticals, where she worked from January 1988 through December 1996, 
eventually rising to the position of Human Resources Manager. (Id. at 105:23 - 106:7). 
Dr. Hayes eventually received BS, MS, and Ph.D. degrees. (Id. at 107:3-5). In 
1996, after Dr. Hayes finished his schooling, he was offered a job at the University of 
Hawaii. (Id. at 118:14-16). Until he became a professor, Dr. Hayes never worked full 
time. (Id. at 106:25 - 107: 2). Instead, he studied full time and worked at various odd 
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jobs, such as a janitor, swim coach, bagel maker, and teaching assistant. (Id. at 106:19-
24). Ms. Baum maintained primary responsibility for paying the family's monthly 
expenses. {Id. at 112:11-18). 
Ms. Baum had to quit her job at NPS so that the family could move to Hawaii for 
Dr. Hayes' teaching career. {Id. at 106:6-12). Dr. Hayes began his job at the University 
of Hawaii while the Ms. Baum looked for housing, dealt with moving the family 
furnishings, and located schooling for Ruby. {Id. at 110:7-8). At the same time, 
Ms. Baum, who had a long history of intermittent headaches and migraines, began to 
experience increasing headaches associated with nausea and vomiting. {Id.; see also 
Exhibit 6, p. 1). She went to the Emergency Room many times, but the doctors were 
unable to make a diagnosis. (R. 591, at 110:8-12). In early 1998, Ms. Baum was 
diagnosed with an operable brain tumor and she had surgery in Hawaii. {See Exhibit 6, 
p.l). The tumor was successfully removed, but the surgery left Ms. Baum with "severe 
depressive symptoms and stable cognitive deficits consistent with the diagnosis of 
dementia related to the brain trauma." (Exhibit 22, p. 1). She has "effectively responded 
to treatment for her depressive symptoms yet continues to have stable cognitive deficits 
in multiple areas including language skills (word finding, substitutions and paraphasic 
errors), speech prosody, short term memory, immediate recall and attention." (Id.). 
In 2000, Dr. Hayes was terminated from the University of Hawaii, and accepted a 
position at Washington State University. (R. 591, at 118:14-16). Ms. Baum moved the 
family again to facilitate Dr. Hayes' career. (Id. at 118:18-21). With her parents' 
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assistance, they bought a house in Idaho (Washington State University was near the 
border). (R. 591, at 119:22 - 120:1). Ms. Baum began to experience additional health 
problems, was subsequently diagnosed with Graves Disease and underwent treatment 
and, eventually, surgery for a thyroid condition. {Id. at 127:1 - 128:3). 
In March of 2004, the marriage dissolved after Ms. Baum and Ruby caught 
Dr. Hayes in compromising circumstances with his graduate student. {Id. at 35:12 — 
36:18). Dr. Hayes admitted he and the graduate student were having an affair. {Id) 
Dr. Hayes moved out of the marital home leaving Ms. Baum with her compromised 
health and in mental distress from her discovery and Dr. Hayes' admission. {Id. at 167:7-
10). The home was sold for a loss, and Ms. Baum and Ruby moved back to Salt Lake 
City to live with Ms. Baum's mother. {See Exhibit 3). Ms. Baum's mother later 
purchased a home for Ms. Baum and Ruby to rent, and required a written lease. (See R. 
591 at 136:9-18; Exhibit 7). 
B. Facts Relating to Ms. Baum's Financial Contributions in the Marital Estate 
From the time of the marriage until the parties moved to Hawaii in 1996, 
Ms. Baum consistently earned more money than Dr. Hayes. This fact is reflected on their 
Social Security statements as set forth in a trial exhibit and summarized as follows: 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
EARNINGS 
Dr. Hayes Ms. Baum 
$7,234.00 
$12,000.00 
$12,790.00 
$9,308.00 
$4,049.00 
$8,244.00 
$21,761.00 
$24,057.00 
$28,359.00 
$32,172.00 
$31,989.00 
$38,350.00 
Total 
$28,995.00 
$36,057.00 
$41,149.00 
$41,480.00 
$36,038.00 
$46,594.00 
Difference 
$14,527.00 
$12,057.00 
$15,569.00 
$22,864.00 
$27,940.00 
$30,106.00 
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Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
EARNINGS 
Dr. Hayes Ms. Baum 
$9,257.00 
$1,145.00 
$4,200.00 
$23,966.00 
$39,999.00 
$48,807.00 
$53,846.00 
$62,700.00 
Total 
$49,256.00 
$49,952.00 
$58,046.00 
$86,666.00 
Difference 
$30,742.00 
$47,662.00 
$49,646.00 
$38,734.00 
(See Exhibit 3, p. 4) 
In addition to contributing her earnings to enable Dr. Hayes to complete his 
education without having to work full time, Ms. Baum also contributed other assets, 
including separate property and all of her retirement assets (including a premarital 
portion), to support the family. For example, in December of 1988, Dr. Hayes and 
Ms. Baum purchased their first home on Hollywood Avenue in Salt Lake City for 
$70,800. {See Exhibit 3, p. 3). Ms. Baum liquidated her entire retirement account at 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute, which was approximately $20,000, to pay toward the 
purchase of the home. (R. 591, at 111:18-24). When the family decided to move to 
Hawaii, they sold the Hollywood Avenue home and used the proceeds as a down 
payment on a condo in Hawaii. {Id. at 117:17-118:7). When the family moved from 
Hawaii to Idaho, Ms. Baum's family assisted the family with two loans for the purchase 
of the home, totaling $276,000. {Id. at 121:10 - 122:23). Ms. Baum's mother also paid 
$9,000 toward a family car. {Id. at 55:17 - 56:2). 
Throughout the marriage, Ms. Baum periodically sold other assets and used the 
proceeds to pay the family's living expenses. For example, she liquidated shares of NPS 
Pharmaceutical stock she had accumulated through an employee purchase program. {Id. 
at 113:9-18). In addition, she liquidated property and other assets she received from her 
7 
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grandfather as an inheritance. (Id. at 115:12-17). Besides paying living expenses, 
Ms. Baum paid off the full amount of Dr. Hayes' school loans, and Dr. Hayes signed a 
promissory note pledging to pay back the entire amount. (Id. at 122:24-123:23; see also 
Exhibit 4). Ms. Baum also paid off another school loan Dr. Hayes had defaulted on, this 
one for radio disc jockey school that he attended before the parties were even married. 
(R. 591, at 123: 12:-23, 134:22-135:6). 
All totaled, Ms. Baum's financial contribution to the marital estate was in excess 
of $500,000, as set forth in trial exhibits and testimony and summarized as follows: 
Year 
1988 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1996 
1997 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2003 
Total 
Asset 
Howard Hughes Retirement (Part 
Premarital) 
Lot (Inherited) 
Land 1/5 MK (Inherited) 
Issac Baum 1st Sec (Inherited) 
Issac Baum 1 st Sec (Inherited) 
NPS Pharm. 
NPS Pharm. 
Oppenheimer 
Oppenheimer 
NPS Pharm. 
NPS Pharm. 
Paine Webber 
NPS Pharm. 
NPS Pharm. 
NPS Pharm. 
NPS Pharm. 
Value 
$20,000.00 
$3,000.00 
$9,800.00 
$600.00 
$2,230.00 
$5,940.00 
$11,876.00 
$476.00 
$6,069.00 
$88,118.00 
$122,909.00 
$143,114.00 
$16,197.00 
$35,025.00 
$30,224.00 
$17,022.00 
$512,600.00 
(See Exhibit 3). For all intents and purposes, Ms. Baum used her salary, her savings and 
investments, her retirement, even her separate assets and inheritance, to financially 
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support the family so Dr. Hayes could concentrate on obtaining his degrees. (R. 591, at 
166:4-24). Ms. Baum also sacrificed her promising career at NPS to further Dr. Hayes' 
career. (Id. at 106:8-15). 
C. Facts Relating to Ms. Baum's Need for Alimony 
Ms. Baum provided a Financial Declaration listing total after-tax needs of $4,124 
and asked that the amount be grossed up to account for taxes she estimated she would 
have to pay to net that amount. (See Exhibit 7, pp. 5-6). She testified the amounts of her 
claimed expenses (other than the tax estimate) reflected her and Ruby's actual expenses. 
These expenses included rent of $1,000 a month payable to her mother for the house 
purchased when Ms. Baum and Ruby relocated to Utah, as well as substantial insurance 
and out-of-pocket medical costs due to her health problems. (R. 591, at 136:9 - 137:24, 
168:2-175:13). 
Following separation, Ms. Baum was awarded temporary alimony in the amount 
of $1,350 per month and temporary child support in the amount of $610 per month, for 
total payments of $1,960 per month. (R. 591, at 205:7-11). Ms. Baum testified she was 
not able to cover all of her expenses with that temporary support, and had to rely on loans 
from her mother to cover many expenses. (Id. at 138:2-21). Ms. Baum's mother lent 
Ms. Baum money to pay for attorney fees, amounting to nearly $64,000 as of trial, as 
well as moving costs, rent, and many month-to-month incidentals charged on credit 
cards. (See Exhibit 8; see also R. 591, at 247:25 - 248:3). As a result, Ms. Baum had 
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over $123,000 in debt as of the time of trial, much of it owed to her mother. (See 
Exhibit 7, pp. 2-3). 
Ms. Baum also testified to the high costs associated with the different medications 
she requires, and introduced evidence of the substantial increase in the cost of insurance 
she would face if indeed she were to be insurable at all when her COBRA coverage 
terminates. (See Exhibit 12). On cross examination, she acknowledged that she claimed 
both $409 for her prescriptions without insurance, and $441 for insurance, and that she 
likely would not need both. (R. 591, at 175:3-13). 
D. Facts Relating to Dr. Hayes' Ability to Pay Alimony 
After Ms. Baum became disabled due to her brain tumor and Dr. Hayes had 
become employed full time as a college professor, Dr. Hayes' earnings exceeded 
Ms. Baum's for the first time in the marriage, as set forth in a trial exhibit and 
summarized as follows: 
Year 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Earnings 
Dr. Hayes M s . B a u m 
$41,612.00 
$46,273.00 
$44,727.00 
$44,458.00 
$59,604.00 
$67,042.00 
$62,257.00 
$66,475.00 
$91,032.44 
$2,200.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$2,700.00 
$16,200.00 
Total 
$43,812.00 
$46,273.00 
$44,727.00 
$44,458.00 
$59,604.00 
$67,042.00 
$62,257.00 
$69,175.00 
$107,232.44 
Difference 
-$39,412.00 
-$46,273.00 
-$44,727.00 
-$44,458.00 
-$59,604.00 
-$67,042.00 
-$62,257.00 
-$63,775.00 
-$74,832.44 
(See Exhibit 3, p. 4). 
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At trial, Dr. Hayes admitted that his 2006 earnings were $96,000, comprising 
$66,600 from his full-time teaching position during the academic year, additional income 
from teaching during the summer, and $21,000 from a second job with Walden 
University, an on-line university. (See Exhibit 41; R. 591, at 61:19 - 65:7, 92:7 - 93:12). 
Dr. Hayes testified that his salary from full-time teaching will increase in the future. (Id. 
at 66:4-6). He also testified he did not know what his income would be for 2007, but his 
income from 2006 was $8,000 per month. (Id at 196:18-24). 
Dr. Hayes speculated that he may not be able to sustain his second job with 
Walden University at all, or at the same level as he has in the past, but he offered no 
proof and said his future pay from such a second job is "impossible to project." (Id. at 
83:9 - 86:8). His position was that he won't be able to earn as much as he did in 2006, 
but should be able to supplement the salary he receives during the academic year through 
teaching summer courses, for total compensation of $72,000. (Id. at 86:9 - 87:1). 
Dr. Hayes admitted at trial that he was able to pay the amount of temporary 
alimony and child support Ms. Baum had been awarded ($1,960 per month), and would 
be able to continue to pay those amounts after the divorce. (Id., at 205:12-15). Dr. Hayes 
also continued to fully fund his retirement, in the amount of $456 per month. 
(Exhibit 110, p.2). Dr. Hayes failed to pay the Guardian ad Litem or Ruby's counselor, 
but was able instead to pay for many lifestyle amenities, including a boat and a boat slip 
he shares with his girlfriend as well as two kayaks and a 2002 Subaru. (R. 591, at 53:12 
-57:3,242:3-243:14). 
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E. Ms, Baum's Appeal, and This Court's Remand. 
Ms. Baum appealed the trial court's original ruling, arguing it was not based on 
adequate findings, was contrary to law and was manifestly unjust. This Court "reverse[d] 
and remand[ed] to allow the trial court to enter more detailed findings." Baum v. Hayes, 
2008 UT App 371, \ 1, 196 P.3d 612. This Court's mandate was "without restriction to 
any corrections or modifications the trial court deems appropriate." Id., 2008 UT App 
371 at H 16. 
F. Trial Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
Following remand, Ms. Baum filed a Motion for Entry of Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. She also filed a supporting memorandum of law 
discussing the applicable analytical framework and Proposed Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, complete with citations to and excerpts of the record, to 
help the trial court address the defects the Court of Appeals found in its prior ruling. (R. 
608-703). Consistent with this Court's reversal and remand, Ms. Baum understood the 
trial court would not be limited simply to seeking any additional justification there might 
be for the result previously reached, but would thoroughly review the record, obtain any 
additional testimony or other evidence it deemed necessary, and make any appropriate 
"corrections or modifications." 
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Dr. Hayes' also filed proposed "Amended Findings."2 That filing, which gave 
Dr. Hayes the opportunity to marshal all the evidence available in support of the trial 
court's original alimony and child support awards, references only two trial exhibits (the 
parties' Financial Declarations) but includes no other citations to or excerpts from the 
record, and contains no legal analysis. 
Instead, in terms of his own income and ability to pay, Dr. Hayes continued to rely 
solely on his own self-serving testimony as to an alleged "conflict" he conveniently 
discovered just before trial between his obligations to Washington State University and 
his online teaching at Walden University to conclude that his income from that teaching 
was "temporary and not a reasonable source of secondary income." (See Amended 
Findings, J^ 9). The objective evidence at trial, however, was that Dr. Hayes had earned 
an additional $21,000 a year from Walden University for the two years preceding trial 
(see Exhibit 25; see also R. 592 at 65:2-5), and additional unrebutted evidence provided 
by Ms. Baum showed he has apparently resolved the alleged "conflict," since he remains 
affiliated with Walden and continues to teach online classes (see R. 673-76). 
In terms of Ms. Baum's needs, Dr. Hayes continued his refrain that Ms. Baum's 
mother should be required to take over the main obligation to support Ms. Baum after this 
nearly 20-year marriage, and therefore Ms. Baum should not have any housing expense. 
(See Amended Findings, ]j 14). The evidence at trial, however was that Ms. Baum is 
2
 Dr. Hayes' "Amended Finding [sic] of Fact and Conclusions of Law Following 
Remand from Court of Appeals," filed and served on or about March 17, 2009, do not 
appear in the Record on Appeal. Accordingly, they are attached as an Addendum 
(hereinafter, "Amended Findings"). 
13 
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indeed obligated to pay rent. (See R. 591 at 136:9 - 18). That obligation is set forth in a 
written, signed lease. (Exhibit 7). Ms. Baum has been unable to pay rent as required by 
the lease, but the arrearages are set forth in a signed Promissory Note. (Exhibit 8). 
Dr. Hayes arbitrarily reduced or eliminated other expenses Ms. Baum needs to 
incur and in fact incurs, including expenses for such obvious needs as health insurance 
and home maintenance, claiming there was "no support" for those expenses. (See 
Amended Findings, ffl[ 14-15). The evidence at trial, however, included support for all of 
Ms. Baum's claimed expenses other than her estimated tax and insurance payments. (See 
R. 591, at 136:9 - 137:24, 168:2 - 175:13; see also Exhibit 12). 
Dr. Hayes9 bottom-line notion of "fairness" in ending this 20-year marriage was 
that he should be able to meet all his claimed expenses, continue to fully fund his 
retirement continued, pay his income taxes and have money left over (see Amended 
Findings, ffij 9, 12), while Ms. Baum should struggle with what he concedes is not enough 
even to pay for health insurance (assuming she can even get it) let alone save for 
retirement (after liquidating all of her own retirement and separate property to help 
Dr. Hayes complete his education) or pay her taxes (she is of course taxed on her 
alimony). (See Amended Findings, % 16; see also R. 591, at 111:18-24, 113:9-18, 
115:12-17, 117:17-118:7, 121:10 - 122:23; R. 592, at 340:9-19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On remand from this Court, the trial court properly applied the law to the 
facts and, consistent with this Court's mandate, supplemented its prior findings of fact 
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and made appropriate corrections and modifications to its alimony and child support 
award. The evidence amply supports the trial court's supplemental findings, and Dr. 
Hayes fails to show the trial court abused its broad discretion in such matters. 
Specifically, the trial court properly did not abuse its discretion in including all of Dr. 
Hayes' historical earnings from teaching in establishing his ability to pay alimony and his 
gross income for child support. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON REMAND DOES NOT MANIFEST 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
"Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Matters within the trial court's broad discretion 
include whether spousal support is sufficient {see Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 
(Utah 1986), and Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985)), and whether an 
award of child custody and support is proper {see Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 
393, 394 (Utah 1985), and Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
"Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the 
court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . 
discretion.'" Childs, 967 P.2d at 944 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
The analytical framework for determining a fair and equitable alimony award is 
well established: 
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First, the trial court should have determined Petitioner's needs . . . . 
Second, the trial court should have determined Petitioner's ability to 
meet her own needs . . . . And if Petitioner is then capable of 
meeting her determined needs, no alimony should be awarded. 
Third, if Petitioner is not able to meet her own needs, the trial court 
should have determined the ability of Respondent to fill the gap 
between Petitioner's needs and her own ability to meet those needs, 
with an eye towards equalizing the parties' standards of living only 
if there is not enough combined ability to maintain both parties at the 
standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage. 
Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App. 506, \ 5, 153 P.3d 827. 
The trial court on remand properly applied this analytical framework. It first 
analyzed Ms. Baum's needs. (See Supplemental Findings of Fact ^ 1-6). Her Financial 
Declaration in this matter lists total after-tax needs of $4,124. (See Trial Exhibit 7, 
pp. 5-6). That amount reflects the actual, documented expenses for both Ms. Baum and 
Ruby, including rent of $1,000 a month payable to Ms. Baum's mother for the house her 
mother purchased after Ms. Baum and Ruby were forced to relocate to Utah when 
Dr. Hayes' affair came to light. (R. 591, at 136:9 - 137:24, 168:2 - 175:13; Trial 
Exhibit 1)? 
Dr. Hayes offered no evidence to contradict Ms. Baum's claimed expenses; he 
merely continued to argue, without evidence, that they were "inflated" - even though 
they are largely comparable to his own claimed needs when reconciled on a line-by-line, 
3
 In presenting the matter to Judge Medley on remand, Ms. Baum showed why it was 
proper to include a housing expense in Ms. Baum's need, citing and analyzing 
specific Utah precedent as well as the facts in the record of this case about how the 
parties historically had taken loans from Ms. Baum's family, documented with intra-
family promissory notes, and Dr. Hayes himself admitted this was consistent with the 
parties' practice during the marriage. (R. 806, p. 10 1. 12 - p. 13 1. 16). 
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item-by-item basis. {See Exhibit 110; R. 806 p. 16 1. 8 - p. 17 1. 16). Among other 
things, he questioned why she would need any money in her budget for such necessities 
as housing and health insurance. (R. 591, at 175:3-13). The competent evidence 
therefore established that Ms. Baum's reasonable needs, without consideration of income 
taxes payable on her alimony, are no less $3,715 (her claimed after-tax needs of $4,124 
minus the $409 claimed for prescriptions without insurance). {See R. 773, \ 6). 
Ms. Baum's ability to meet her own needs was not in dispute on remand. The 
original trial court recognized that Ms. Baum's brain surgery rendered her unable to 
return to anything like her former employment, determined she is partially disabled, and 
imputed income of $750 - a finding not challenged on either appeal. (R. 592, at 339:25
 r 
- 340:23). That leaves $2,965 in unmet, after-tax needs. Clearly, Ms. Baum is unable to 
come close to meeting her needs, even if she could become employed; thus alimony is 
appropriate. {See R. 774, \ 7). 
The trial court then turned to a detailed analysis of Dr. Hayes' ability to pay. {See 
R. 774-76, Iff 8-18). The undisputed evidence showed Dr. Hayes earned gross income 
of $91,000 in 2005 and $96,000 in 2006. {See Exhibit 25; see also R. 592, at 65:2-5). 
This income came not only from his main teaching job, supplemented through summer 
courses, but also through on-line teaching for Walden University. {Id) Dr. Hayes 
speculated he might not be able to continue the work he has done for Walden University 
in the past, but he offered no evidence of that, and he continues to be publicly listed 
among the Walden University faculty. {See R. 774-75, U 11). E y e n if he were not still 
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employed by Walden, there is no reason he cannot continue to work in some similar 
capacity to replace the income he previously obtained from Walden University while he 
is teaching full time. Thus for purposes of determining the parties' respective rights and 
obligations, the trial court properly imputed income to Dr. Hayes of at least $96,000 a 
year, or $8,000 a month, based on the above case law requiring the trial court to rely on 
the best evidence of future earnings, i.e., recent past earnings. (See R. 775-76, f 16). 
In determining Dr. Hayes' ability to pay, the trial court also properly considered 
his own reasonable needs, since his ability to pay depends in part on his own "needs and 
expenditures." See Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 438 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The 
trial court implicitly found reasonable Respondent's claimed after-tax needs, as set forth 
in his Financial Declaration, of $2,369 per month. (See Exhibit 110, p. 5). Assuming a 
combined effective tax rate of 25% on his $8,000 gross monthly income, and continued 
contributions to his retirement of $456 per month, the trial court properly determined 
Dr. Hayes has an ability to pay of at least $2,475 per month while still fully meeting his 
own claimed needs ($8,000 - ($8000 x 25%) - $456 - $2,369 - $700 = $2,475). (See 
R. 776,^18). 
The foregoing analysis, all of which was grounded in evidence presented to the 
trial court on remand, clearly demonstrates that Ms. Baum was properly awarded child 
support in the amount of $700 per month, based on gross income of $750 a month 
imputed to her and Respondent's gross income of $8,000 per month. The receipt of 
child support, which is not taxable to Ms. Baum, reduces her total post-tax need to 
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$2,265. Assuming a lower combined effective tax rate for Ms. Baum of 20%, a gross 
alimony payment of $2,900 would be required to meet Ms. Baum's post-tax need for 
alimony. Because that amount is in excess of Dr. Hayes' ability to pay, however, the 
trial court was within its discretion in capping his obligation at the $2,475 per month he 
is demonstrably able to pay. (See R. 776, |^ 18). 
This award is not only firmly rooted in the law and the facts, but also is more than 
fair and equitable to Dr. Hayes, taking into account as required his actual earning 
capacity; Ms. Baum's substantially greater financial contributions during the parties' 
marriage; Ms. Baum's indisputably diminished ability to meet her own needs due to her 
disability; Ms. Baum's needs as the custodial parent; and the fact that the disparity in the 
share of Dr. Hayes' income between the parties will only increase after child support 
terminates. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's Supplemental 
Findings, and having failed to show that the Supplemental Findings are so contrary to 
the evidence as to leave this Court with "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made," Dr. Hayes argues that the trial court's decision should nevertheless be 
reversed, and the original decision reinstated, based on the "law of the case" doctrine and 
the "mandate rule." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12 - 16). Ms. Baum respectfully submits 
that Dr. Hayes' arguments are both factually and legally incorrect. 
Dr. Hayes' arguments are factually incorrect because the trial court's detailed 
supplemental findings do in fact demonstrate that its prior alimony and child support 
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award were clearly erroneous, and they clearly conform to this Court's mandate. What 
the trial court did on remand was consider the pleadings submitted by the parties 
following remittitur; review the entire record in light of this Court's instructions on 
remand; and apply the appropriate analytical framework, taking into account as required 
Ms. Baum's demonstrated and indeed undisputed needs of $3,175 per month after taxes 
and Dr. Hayes' actual, historical earnings as a means of identifying his ability to pay of at 
least $2,475 per month after taxes and after his own reasonable expenses. {See R. 772-
78). 
Based on its analysis, the trial court properly concluded that an award of $1,200 a 
month in alimony was inadequate, unfair, and unjust to Ms. Baum, and that child support 
based on an amount lower than Dr. Hayes had demonstrated he was historically capable 
of earning was also inadequate, unfair, and unjust to Ruby. Indeed, Ms. Baum 
demonstrated that the trial court's prior ruling was in fact clearly erroneous, citing the 
analogous precedent of Howell v. Howell, where this Court noted the clear error in an 
alimony award that left a husband with the overwhelming majority of his gross income 
and wife with a disproportionately smaller share - an imbalance that would only become 
worse when, as has occurred here, child support terminated - as well as the precedent of 
Richardson v. Richardson, 2007 UT App 222 (Memorandum Decision), where this Court 
upheld a trial court's incrementally increasing alimony at the end of a long-term marriage 
as child support decreased. (R. 806, at p. 3 1. 19 - p. 7 1. 20). Based on these precedents, 
the trial court's conclusion is unassailable, particularly in light of Ms. Baum's 
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substantially greater financial contributions during the parties' marriage, Ms. Baum's 
now indisputably diminished ability to meet her own needs due to her disability, and 
Dr. Hayes' ability to continue working and increasing his income as he gains tenure and 
otherwise advances in the career Ms. Baum enabled him to enjoy. 
Dr. Hayes' arguments are legally incorrect because they misapprehend and 
misapply both the "law of the case" doctrine and the "mandate rule." Contrary to 
Dr. Hayes' arguments, given the procedural posture and substantive issues in this case, 
neither the "law of the case doctrine" nor the "mandate rule" serves here to limit the trial 
court's discretion on remand to reach different conclusions based on additional findings. 
Dr. Hayes relies principally on the case of In re E.K, 2006 UT 36, 137 P.3d 809, 
for his "law of the case" argument. That case involved, among other important issues, a 
second trial judge's decision (not on remand, but at a later stage of pre-appeal trial court 
proceedings) to reverse the first trial judge's order approving a stipulation, the central 
feature of which was an agreed-upon procedure to determine what custodial arrangement 
was in the best interests of a minor child in an otherwise contentious custody proceeding. 
Id, 2006 UT 36, ffl[ 9, 12. After the agreed-upon procedure resulted in a determination 
that custody should be granted to the child's mother rather than the putative adoptive 
parents, the adoptive parents, having previously agreed that the determination would be 
binding, changed their mind and sought to circumvent the stipulation. M , ^ 11-13. 
When the mother appealed, this Court determined that the second judge improperly set 
aside the parties' stipulation. Id.
 9^ 15. 
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After an extended discussion of the "law of the case" doctrine, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded simply that this Court had "misapprehended" the application of that 
doctrine to the second judge's rejection of the parties' stipulation, and in doing so made 
it clear that "considerations of law of the case must yield to those of the substance of the 
underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper standard of review." Id., % 33. Having 
so found, the Supreme Court analyzed "the substance of the underlying ruling," 
determined that it comprised a legal error, and applied a correctness standard of review. 
Id.,%34. 
Dr. Hayes' discussion of the "law of the case" doctrine ironically is not only 
characterized by the very analytical flaws the Supreme Court warned against in In re 
E.H., but also compounds those flaws by suggesting that, following appeal, reversal and 
remand by this Court, the trial court's discretion was severely limited. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has explained, "whether a trial court has discretion to reconsider a prior 
decision it has made" depends on "the procedural posture of a case at the time the law of 
the case doctrine is invoked." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 2008 
UT 73, ^ f 27. Application of the "law of the case" in this context does not bind the trial 
court on remand to a previous ruling the appellate court has expressly instructed it to 
reconsider. Were this the case, the reversal and remand would be a futile and worthless 
exercise. 
The procedural posture of this case when presented to the second trial court judge 
was that it had been reversed and remanded "for more detailed findings without 
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restriction to any corrections or modifications the trial court deems appropriate." Baum 
v. Hayes, 2008 UT App 371, |^ 16 (emphasis added). Dr. Hayes chose to simply ignore 
the procedural posture and insist the second trial judge could do nothing but bolster its 
original conclusion. That is contrary to the Supreme Court's core teaching in In re E.H.: 
where the trial court retains the ultimate discretion and is "entitled to exercise 
considerable latitude" in crafting an appropriate resolution of matters within that 
discretion, which indisputably include ascertaining a wife's needs and a husband's 
ability to pay. It would be inappropriate to unduly constrain that discretion on remand. 
In re E.H.y 2006 UT 36, f^ 37 (concluding this Court "reached too far when it reinstated 
the stipulation and the order of the first judge that gave it legal effect."). 
Dr. Hayes' "mandate rule" argument is even less persuasive in light of the key 
language in this Court's remand that he chose and continues now to ignore. It is difficult 
to see how the trial court's supplemental findings, which indisputably provide more 
detail than its original findings, and its modification of the alimony and child support 
awards, which are fully consistent with those supplemental findings, run afoul of this 
Court's open-ended mandate. Indeed, it appears the only way the "mandate rule" could 
apply here is if this Court had itself specifically endorsed the first trial court's findings 
and conclusions - something this Court manifestly did not do. Perhaps this is why 
Dr. Hayes utterly fails to provide any meaningful analysis, in his roughly one-page 
discussion, of how the "mandate rule" might apply here. This Court clearly understood 
that the issue of including or excluding Dr. Hayes' Walden income could be resolved in 
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favor of either party on remand and thus empowered the trial court with significant 
discretion on remand. Baum v. Hayes, 2008 UT App 371, J^ 16 ("each of the party's 
arguments may have merit depending on the reason the trial court excluded Hayes' 
additional income."). 
To the extent Dr. Hayes suggests the trial court's supplemental findings do not 
comply with the "mandate rule" because they remain insufficient, two points should be 
made. 
First, that suggestion is inconsistent with the relief Dr. Hayes seeks, which is that 
this court "vacate the second trial court's findings and conclusions and reinstate the first 
trial court's findings and conclusions of law." (Appellant's Brief, p. 16). If the findings 
were still insufficient, which they are not, the appropriate relief would be to remand 
again. 
Second, a trial court's obligation is to make sufficiently detailed findings on each 
relevant factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based upon the applicable factors. See Smith v. Smith, 726 
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986) (appellate courts must ensure the decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence."); Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 
TI9 (trial court's findings "should be more than cursory statements; they must be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached"). Dr. Hayes does not address 
this standard; the trial court's Supplemental Findings satisfy it. 
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In short, in this case as in In re E.H., irrespective of the "law of the case" doctrine 
or the "mandate rule/' the only question properly before this Court on Dr. Hayes' appeal 
is whether the trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law show 
that its modifications to its original alimony and child support determinations are 
supported by the evidence, or on the other hand are so inadequate or contrary to the 
evidence as to manifest an abuse of discretion. Because the trial court did what it was 
asked to do on remand, applied the proper analytical framework and made supplemental 
findings necessary to reach a reasoned determination of alimony and child support based 
on the evidence, its decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVISED ITS ALIMONY RULING AS 
TO DR. HAYES' ABILTITY TO PAY BASED ON HIS HISTORICAL 
EARNINGS AND UNDISPUTED CONTINUING ASSOCIATION WITH 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY. 
Established Utah law requires that in determining alimony the trial court consider 
income from all sources, including "overtime, second job, self-employment, etc." 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). To the extent one has attained a level of 
income from various sources in the past, but chooses not to do so during the pendency of 
a divorce proceeding, he is voluntarily underemployed, and the trial court can properly 
impute to him future earnings based on his past earnings. See Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 
1267-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (court can "appropriately rel[y] on historical rather than 
income at the time of divorce"). If his "income later proves to be 'seriously and 
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permanently diminished/ that party may seek a modification." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the undisputed evidence showed Dr. Hayes made $91,000 in 2005 and 
$96,000 in 2006. {See Exhibit 25; see also R. 592, at 65:2-5). This income came not 
only from his main teaching job, supplemented through summer courses (as the trial court 
found), but also through on-line teaching for Walden University. {Id) Dr. Hayes 
speculated he might not be able to continue the work he has done for Walden University 
in the past, but he offered no conflict letter or any other evidence to support his position, 
nor did he offer any reason or evidence he cannot continue to work in some capacity to 
replace the income he previously obtained from Walden University while he is teaching 
full time. 
Dr. Hayes argues that the trial court "did not consider the required factors in 
determining alimony as was mandated by the appellate court," but instead "focused on 
the Appellant's expenses" and improperly considered the undisputed evidence of his 
continuing employment by Walden University notwithstanding his self-serving 
speculation at trial that he would not be able to continue that affiliation. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 16-18). 
The argument that the trial court did not consider the required Jones factors is 
spurious, since the trial court's Supplemental Findings demonstrably and expressly do 
consider the required factors, under the specific headings of "Petitioner's Needs" and 
"Respondent's Ability to Pay." The argument that the trial court improperly considered 
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Dr. Hayes' lifestyle and expenses is similarly groundless, since Appellant's expenses 
must be considered as part of his ability to pay. See Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, TJ 
19, 201 P.3d 301, cert denied, 211 P.3d 986 (Utah 2009) ("adequate analysis of the 
factor regarding ability to pay must do more than simply state the payor spouse's 
income." The court must also consider the payor spouse's "needs and expenditures, 
such as housing, payment of debts, and other living expenses.") (emphasis and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
As for Dr. Hayes' argument that the trial court improperly considered evidence of 
his continuing employment by Walden University, it is worth noting again that this 
Court provided the trial court a broad mandate to make additional findings as to whether 
Dr. Hayes' historical income should be excluded. Following remittitur, Ms. Baum 
provided the evidence of Dr. Hayes' continuing employment with Walden University. 
Dr. Hayes did not dispute, and has not to this day disputed, either that evidence or the 
fact of his continuing employment. 
Ms. Baum was fully prepared to produce even more evidence, specifically stating 
in her post-remittitur filings: "If this Court believes it is necessary or appropriate to 
conduct a further evidentiary hearing on the specific issues of Petitioner's needs and 
Respondent's ability to pay, since a different Judge presided at the original trial, 
Petitioner will of course participate and provide such information as may be helpful to 
the Court in fulfilling its duty to reach a fair and equitable result." (R. 715). 
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Dr. Hayes did not object to any specific evidence or offer any of his own. Instead, 
he took the position that no further proceedings or evidence was necessary because no 
different outcome could be reached. (R. 806, p. 22 11. 3-20, arguing "the clock stopped 
in March 2007" at the time of trial; id., p. 24 1. 24 - p. 25 1. 5, arguing the second judge 
was "locked into" making additional findings that supported the first judge's decision). 
Only now does Dr. Hayes belatedly argue, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court 
should not have considered this specific evidence that is directly contrary to his 
unsupported speculation at trial. 
This is procedurally improper - specific and timely objections and motions must 
be made before the lower court, then identified for the appellate court. See State v. 
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820- 21 (Utah 1989); State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). It is also substantively incorrect. The trial court's duty on remand was to 
make further findings as to Dr. Hayes' ability to pay. It exercised that duty well within 
the confines of this Court's clear mandate and the broad discretion it has on such 
matters. See Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Whether 
overtime work will continue at a certain level" is within trial court's discretion); Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (whether a defendant is voluntarily 
underemployed is within trial court's discretion). The trial court's conclusion should be 
affirmed. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVISED ITS CHILD SUPPORT 
RULING BASED ON DR. HAYESf HISTORICAL EARNINGS. 
Finally, Dr. Hayes argues that the trial court erroneously used his historical 
earnings as the basis for calculating his child support obligation. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 18-19). As this Court has consistently held, trial courts have broad discretion to 
select an appropriate means of calculating income when awarding child support, and this 
Court will uphold a trial court's calculation of income for child support purposes absent a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211. Thus 
in Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court rejected the 
very argument Dr. Hayes makes on appeal: that the trial court violated Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.5(2) (now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(2)) because it considered his entire 
income rather than "the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job." Once again, Dr. Hayes' 
argument is both factually and legally flawed. 
As a factual matter, Dr. Hayes' full-time job as a university professor does not, by 
his own description, involve year-round full-time employment. Thus he has historically 
supplemented his base teaching salary with various other teaching jobs both during the 
academic year and during his summer break. Dr. Hayes does not demonstrate that his 
efforts amount to anything more than the equivalent of one year-round full-time job, and 
in fact his "job" is clearly not limited to his teaching for Washington State University but 
extends to any teaching he might do for anyone. This makes it proper for the trial court 
to consider all income related to his teaching as emanating from a single "job." See 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("The trial court's decision 
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to consider Bowcut's second source of income as part of his primary job is supported by 
the fact that both sources involved the performance of Bowcut's professional duties as a 
physician. Bowcut maintains a private medical practice and his "second job" consists of 
his contract with the Utah County Jail to provide medical services. Thus, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in considering Bowcut's second source of income."). 
In any event, the relevant statute specifically authorizes the trial courts to consider 
the actual historical record: "If and only if during the time prior to the original support 
order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's 
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability 
to provide child support." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(2). As Dr. Hayes himself 
notes, this very pattern was established and in place for at least two years before the child 
support order was established in the Decree. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 5). Thus, the trial 
court's considering Dr. Hayes' historical income for purposes of child support as well as 
alimony was well within the trial court's broad discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Baum respectfully asks that this Court affirm the trial 
court's alimony and property division as consistent with established legal and equitable 
requirements. Ms. Baum also asks that this Court award her attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal. 
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DATED this \°i day of July, 2010. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLEE KATHY J. BAUM were sent by 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, address to the following: 
Randall Lee Marshall 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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JAMES H. WOODALL (5361) 
WOODALL & WASSERMANN 
Attorneys for respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * 
KATHY J. BAUM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MICHAEL T. HAYES, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED FINDING OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW FOLLOWING REMAND 
FROM COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 04-4905929 DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came on for trial on March 5-6, 2007 before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby. Petitioner was present and represented by Kenneth A. Okazaki. Respondent was 
present and represented by James H. Woodall. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree of Divorce on May 24, 2007. Petitioner appealed the Court's decision to the 
Court of Appeals. In a published opinion dated October 23, 2008, the appellate court remanded 
the matter for more detailed findings in support of the Court's alimony award. 
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Petitioner had been a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah for more than 
three months prior to the filing of this matter. 
2. The parties have irreconcilable differences which prevent the continuation 
of their marriage. Petitioner shall be granted a decree of divorce from respondent on such 
grounds, to become final upon entry. 
3. The parties have one child in common, Ruby Samantha Baum-Hayes, born 
April 18, 1992. It is in Ruby's best interests that the parties be awarded her joint legal custody, 
with petitioner awarded Ruby's physical custody. 
4. Respondent shall be entitled to exercise parent time with Ruby under the 
relocation statute as set forth at § 30-3-37, Utah Code Ann. The Court recognizes that parent 
time problems have occurred. Both parties shall be required to work together to do everything 
they can to remedy these problems. 
5. Petitioner, in particular, shall be required to cooperate fully with respondent 
to ensure visits. She shall maintain a positive point of view about respondent in her discussions 
with Ruby. She shall not schedule any activities for Ruby during respondent's parent time. 
Finally, she shall indicate to Ruby that it is not her choice to visit with respondent, but rather a 
responsibility she has to her father. 
6. Petitioner shall be ordered to accept telephone calls from respondent to 
arrange visits. Discussions shall be limited to Ruby, and shall not get into the causes for the 
divorce. The Court expects the parties to jointly work together to arrange visits. It is not 
respondent's responsibility to do so alone, nor is it his responsibility to schedule visits through 
Ruby. 
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7. The parties shall make every effort to avoid discussing issues relating to 
the divorce in Ruby's presence, or involving Ruby in their conflict in any way. The parties shall 
make every effort to resolve their conflicts, understanding that until the conflict is resolved once 
and for all, Ruby will continue to be distracted and agitated by the conflict. 
8. Petitioner shall have a continuing duty to notify respondent of Ruby's 
medical and educational needs, and to share such information with respondent. The parties are to 
attempt to make important decisions jointly, but in the event of a dispute, petitioner shall have the 
final authority. 
9. The Court finds that respondent should maintain his full time employment 
with Washington State University at an annual salary of $66,600. The Court finds that respondent 
has the ability to earn an additional $8,400 during the summer months, for a total of $75,000. On 
his Amended Financial Declaration (respondent's Exhibit 10), respondent reports gross monthly 
income of $5,933 ($71,196 annually) and net monthly income of $3,901. The Court will adjust 
respondent's monthly income to $6,250 gross and $4,109 net. The Court recognizes that 
respondent has earned income in excess of this amount, primarily from Walden University. The 
Court accepts respondent's testimony that this employment was temporary and not a reasonable 
source of supplemental income because it conflicted with his primary employment. Consequently, 
the Court has excluded this source of income. 
10. The Court regards petitioner as partially disabled as a result of a brain 
tumor that was discovered during the parties' marriage. From the testimony of the parties' 
experts, the Court is persuaded that petitioner is capable of working, and will impute $750 per 
month to her, with an estimated net monthly income of $600. 
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11. Using these figures, respondent shall be ordered to pay petitioner $565 per 
month as child support until Ruby attains the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school, 
whichever occurs last. Respondent shall also maintain medical insurance for Ruby's benefit for as 
long as she is eligible, as his sole expense, as well as life insurance for as long as he has a child 
support obligation Ruby. The parties shall each pay one-half of Ruby's out-of-pocket medical 
expenses, including the costs of her therapy with Dr. Johanna McManemin. 
12. Respondent's Amended Financial Declaration reports monthly needs of 
$2,369. Of this figure, $1,740 is allocated to ongoing living expenses. The remainder is 
earmarked for debt service, including a $215 automobile payment. The Court finds this to be 
reasonable. Deducting respondent's needs from his net monthly income of $4,109, respondent has 
the ability to pay $1,740 per month, $565 of which has already been allocated as child support. 
This leaves respondent with $1,175 available to pay petitioner. 
13. In her Financial Declaration (petitioner's Exhibit 7), petitioner reports 
monthly needs of $4,924. She requests monthly support of $4,941. This exceeds respndent's net 
monthly income; if the Court entered such an order, respondent would be left with nothing to 
meet his expenses. It is evident to the Court that there is not enough money for the parties to live 
as they did prior to their separation, and that they lived beyond their means at that time. 
14. The Court concludes that petitioner's listed needs are exaggerated in many 
respects. For example, she has included $800 per month to pay taxes on a hypothetical alimony 
award. No evidence was presented to support this claim. The Court will exclude it as 
speculative. Other expenses, while ideal, are not actually being paid; petitioner conceded that, 
with the exception of a single payment in 2004, she has not paid her mother any rent (claimed to 
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be $1,000) on the home she claims to be renting. There was no support for petitioner's claim for 
$150 per month for home maintenance, $50 for laundry and dry cleaning, over $600 per month 
for medical and dental expenses, or $441 for medical insurance. 
15. Cumulatively, this amounts to over $3,000 in speculative or unsupported 
expenses. In addition to the tax oti alimony, the Court will disallow the rent and medical 
insurance costs because neither is actually paid. Based on petitioner's testimony that she pays 
modest amounts for yard care and sprinkler maintenance, the Court will allow $50 per month for 
home maintenance. The dry cleaning expense of $50 will be disallowed as unecessary. Finally, 
based on petitioner's testimony, the Court will reduce petitioner's medical and dental expenses to 
$200 per month. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner's actual monthly needs are $2,350. 
16. Deducting petitioner's imputed net monthly income of $600, petitioner will 
be left with a monthly shortfall of $1,750. Deducting respondent's child support of $565, 
petitioner needs $1,185 as alimony. Considering the nature of petitioner's disability, the parties' 
respective needs and abilities to pay, the Court will order respondent to pay petitioner $1,200 per 
month as alimony, commencing March 1, 2007 and continuing until petitioner's death, remarriage, 
or cohabitation. The Court will not require respondent to maintain life insurance for petitioner's 
benefit. Petitioner may maintain continuing medical insurance under COBRA, but it shall be at 
her sole expense. 
17. The Court recognized that both parties contributed all of their available 
resources to the marriage. While respondent's financial contribution was not nearly as significant 
as petitioner's, the Court will not structure a property award based on the parties' relative 
contributions, nor will it attempt to restore either party to his or her former condition. The Court 
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notes that petitioner received 85% of the contents of the parties' home at separation. The parties 
shall each retain the furniture, furnishings, bank accounts, vehicles, and personal property in his or 
her possession, free of any claim by the other. Respondent shall therefore retain the Ford Escort 
automobile, which the Court values at $3,700, with no obligation to hold it for Ruby. Nor shall 
respondent be required to pay for Ruby's trip to Europe. The Court does not believe either party 
has the ability to pay for it. 
18. Respondent shall be responsible for $1,500 of the Guardian Ad Litem's 
fees, representing those fees incurred prior to his reappointment. Thereafter, petitioner shall be 
responsible for all such fees. 
19. The Sky miles accounts shall be divided equally as of March 6, 2007. The 
Court does not find that the Summiya business has any value. It shall be awarded to respondent. 
20. Respondent shall pay petitioner $951, representing one-half of the 2004 
income tax refund, plus $5,655, representing a portion of petitioner's moving expenses. 
21. Each party shall be responsible for the debts and obligations in his or her 
name, and those debts he or she assumed upon the parties' separation. The Court will not order 
respondent to reimburse petitioner for the payments she claims to have made on his behalf, or for 
the loans she made to him during the marriage. 
22. Petitioner transferred her investment account into an irrevocable trust for 
Ruby's benefit. While it was improper for her to do so, the Court will leave those funds for 
Ruby's benefit. Respondent's 401(k) account shall be divided equally, using February 28, 2007 
as the valuation date. 
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23. The fees incurred in this matter are a great concern to the Court. Petitioner 
claims over $70,000 in fees, which she asks respondent be ordered to pay. The Court concludes 
that neither party has the ability to pay the fees they have incurred. Accordingly, each party shall 
be responsible for his or her fees, without reimbursement from the other. 
DATED this day of , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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